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The high-frequency analysis of foreign exchange dynamics is helpful in order to better 
identify the impact of central bank interventions. Evidence robustly shows that interventions 
do indeed move the exchange rate level in the desired direction. Interventions increase 
volatility in the short run as they are regarded as information; but they can reduce volatility 
overall. Ways of transmission may reach beyond the signaling channel and also include the 
portfolio balance and a damping channel. Finally, interventions are more successful if they 
obey certain conditions, such as being coordinated among central banks and going with the 
market and fundamentals. 
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High-frequency analysis of foreign exchange interventions: 




The analysis of central bank interventions in foreign exchange has entered new terrain 
during the last few years by making use of high-frequency data. Such intraday data is crucial 
to disentangle the impact of interventions from other determinants of exchange rates. Due to 
this new approach, we have now gained a much more precise understanding about the effect 
of interventions, which is also helpful for policy-makers. That is, the analytical “standard 
raised” (Sarno and Taylor, 2001) in answering some long-standing questions. In addition, new 
issues have come up, too. This survey addresses both progress made and actual issues. 
Central bank interventions belong to the traditional and conventional economic policy 
tools, although we recognize that this instrument seems to have lost importance among lead-
ing industrialized economies since the mid-1990s.
1 Nevertheless, there are three important 
reasons to study foreign exchange interventions today: first, even in the main exchange rates 
there occur interventions until today, in particular from the Japanese, and to an increasing 
extent by way of so-called oral interventions, i.e. statements of relevant authorities without 
putting money behind it (Fratzscher, 2006, Park and Song, 2008). Second, interventions are of 
undiminished importance in many currencies which are not fully flexible. This applies indeed 
to most currencies in the world, among them crucial ones of our present time, such as the 
Chinese renminbi, and it applies for example to the currencies within the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System II, such as the Danish krone. Third, the appli-
cation of the microstructure approach to exchange rates (Lyons, 2001), has been a motivation 
to analyze extremely detailed and comprehensive data sets which allow new insights into the 
operations and the impact of central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets to be 
gained. 
The motivation for this paper is primarily derived from the third argument mentioned 
above, i.e. high-frequency research in foreign exchange. This research “allows precise track-
                                                 
1  Foreign exchange interventions have experienced controversial and time-varying assessment during 
the last decades (see Sarno und Taylor, 2001). After a period of almost unequivocal rejection as a 
means of economic policy at the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the assessment 
changed several times. Interventions always gained attention because major exchange rates seemed to 
be misaligned, most obviously the strong US-dollar in early 1985 (Frankel, 1985). At that time the 
Plaza agreement occurred where the most important central banks successfully coordinated interven-
tions against the US-dollar.   3
ing of how the market absorbs actual central bank trades” and thus works “like a doctor who 
has a patient ingest blue dye to determine how it passes through the system” (Evans and Ly-
ons, 2001, p.22). In fact, high-frequency data provide this “blue dye” and we take the use of 
such intraday data as the key characteristic to define the empirical research being covered by 
this study.
2 
By contrast, other surveys succeeding Sarno and Taylor (2001) have a different focus. 
King (2003) distinguishes between policy objectives and tactical objectives of interventions 
and shows how these different objectives can lead to contrasting recommendations for an op-
timal intervention policy. Neely (2005) provides a thorough discussion of the empirical litera-
ture, distinguishing between time-series and event studies. An emphasis is on methodological 
problems to control for reverse causality and to potentially consider non-linear dynamic im-
pacts of intervention. A complementary perspective is provided by Vitale (2007), who exam-
ines the state of literature from a theoretical microstructure viewpoint. This viewpoint is 
elaborated in Vitale (2006). Finally, Neely (2008) conducted a questionnaire survey in order 
to learn about monetary authorities’ motivations for interventions, which nicely adds to the 
other surveys. 
The core question of any foreign exchange intervention is of course, whether the central 
bank is able to influence the market at all. In this respect, high-frequency work has produced 
some remarkably clear-cut results: first, interventions do move the exchange rate in the de-
sired direction, at least at an intraday horizon. Second, interventions increase volatility in the 
short run if they are regarded as information, but they may reduce volatility overall. Third, 
interventions may impact the market not only via a signaling but also via a portfolio balance 
and a damping channel. Fourth, interventions are more successful if they obey certain condi-
tions, such as being coordinated among central banks. 
Our paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 develops a framework from pre-
ceding empirical work to motivate and organize the discussion of high-frequency research. 
Section 3 discusses insights from intervention studies based on quotes and press reports. 
However, transactions data, which lay the foundation for the main body of research covered 
in Section 4 are more reliable. The contributions of most recent studies based on order flow 
data are surveyed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses policy implications and Section 7 con-
cludes. 
                                                 
2  Indeed, Sarno and Taylor (2001) cover due to their paper’s genesis in the late 1990s only two of the 
early high-frequency studies on interventions, i.e. Peiers (1997) and Chang and Taylor (1998).   4
2.  Preceding empirical work and issues of high-frequency studies 
This section gives a short review of the state of discussion before the high-frequency 
studies became a major instrument in analyzing exchange rate interventions. In order to pro-
vide a systematic overview, we first suggest a simple structure of issues being analyzed in the 
foreign exchange intervention literature. 
At the heart of central bank interventions is of course the objective to influence the ex-
change rate level or returns when directly focusing on exchange rate changes. This issue is 
thus put at the start of Figure 1 and is given the issue number 1. A second issue of interest has 
been the kind of intervention being conducted, a third debate has discussed potential channels 
by which interventions may influence exchange rate levels and finally, a fourth issue of re-
search has been about the conditions that help making interventions more successful. 
The state of discussion on these four issues in the late 1990s can quickly be summarized 
as follows: Regarding the price impact of interventions (issue no.1), studies since the 1970s 
have assessed the price impact of central bank interventions in the major foreign exchange 
markets with much skepticism. If they concede any effect on the market, then for a very short-
run horizon only, where, unfortunately, convincing empirical evidence was missing at that 
time. Examples for this position include the so-called Jurgensen Report (see Sarno and Tay-
lor, 2001, for an account). Also, the academic survey studies of Edison (1993) and Alme-
kinders (1995) conclude that there are no very robust relations between interventions and in-
tended changes in exchange rate returns (or volatility)(see also Lewis, 1995). Even Sarno and 
Taylor (2001) who assess the potential of interventions somewhat more optimistically by re-
ferring to the monograph of Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and related work (e.g. 
Dominguez and Frankel, 1993a), concede the specificity of this study with respect to data and 
approach. 
Moreover, it has been found useful to distinguish between sterilized interventions, 
where the central bank offsets the intervention impact on the domestic monetary base, and 
non-sterilized interventions (issue no.2). The latter would clearly have an effect on exchange 
rates, however, typical interventions nowadays occur in the form of sterilized interventions 
whose effect is less obvious. The debate on transmission channels of intervention, i.e. issue 
no.3, has focused on two main channels by which interventions affect the market, i.e. the port-
folio balance channel and the signaling channel. The former requires domestic and foreign 
assets to be imperfect substitutes, an assumption that becomes less relevant in globalizing 
financial markets. Moreover, the amount of daily interventions is usually a few 100 million 
US dollars, whereas trading volume may be 100 to 1,000 times as much in the main markets.   5
The signaling channel, by contrast, regards interventions as a tool to signal information and 
intention to market participants and thus does not necessarily depend on the volume of inter-
ventions – accordingly, it was seen as the more relevant channel of transmission. 
This relates to issue no.4, i.e. the influence from various intervention objectives on the 
assessment of intervention effects. To give an example, many studies find that “leaning 
against the wind” is the most prominent ambition but that central banks may differ in their 
emphasis on possible specifications (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001, p.859). Even if we neglect 
such differences, how can we measure the success of leaning against the wind as there is an 
endogeneity problem? Obviously, central banks intervene because they want to change some-
thing or at least want to prevent worse developments. Wouldn’t it be a success in this sense if 
interventions could lower the “winds”, even if they cannot reverse them? In a regression of 
interventions on exchange rate changes, however, this may look like a failure because inter-
ventions could not change a trend, although they may have weakened the trend. Intervention 
objectives may cause another important problem in assessing intervention success: the signal-
ing channel naturally assumes that interventions go in the same direction as the stance of 
monetary policy being credibly signaled by interventions. However, there occur more contro-
versial situations as well (e.g. Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996, Baillie et al., 2000, Vitale, 2003), 
where interventions may signal just the reverse of monetary policy stance in the sense that 
interventions are used as instruments because policy does not want to implement otherwise 
necessary measures, such as interest rate changes (see Goodhart and Hesse, 1993). Then, of 
course, the effect from interventions is unclear (and does not say anything about the instru-
ment as such). 
Overall, there is a clear need of more precise analyses on the effect of foreign exchange 
interventions and, obviously, high-frequency data are highly welcome in this respect. Their 
main advantage is allowing for a better identification of intervention impact. Intraday data 
focus on a narrow time window which contains less noise, i.e. fewer other influences on ex-
change rates occurring during the day, and which tentatively overcomes the endogeneity prob-
lem of interventions. Better measurement is also helpful to identify possible effects from the 
less powerful sterilized interventions and from the limited volumes used in intervention op-
erations. In summary, analyses based on high-frequency data provide better answers on “old” 
issues but – in addition – they also address several interesting “new” issues. 
Two new issues extend the impact analysis of interventions from the exclusive focus on 
exchange rate returns (or levels) to volatility and spreads. Of course, the issue of volatility 
(no.5) is not completely new as the stabilization of volatile markets has always been men-  6
tioned as a major motivation for interventions. However, due to the limited impact of inter-
ventions, it seems fair to conclude that a relevant measure of volatility in this context should 
be based on intraday data. This applies analogously to the consideration of spreads, i.e. issue 
no.6. For a graphical overview about the new issues see Figure 2 which extends Figure 1. 
Further new issues include sharpening the analysis of intervention impact by also con-
sidering counterfactuals (no.7), the precise identification of interventions not just from press 
reports but by actual information (no.8), the consideration of a new transmission channel – the 
damping channel – whose analysis requires high-frequency order flow data (no.9), and finally 
a systematic analysis of conditions of successful interventions (no.10).
3 
Beyond the scope of this survey, there is still ongoing research on interventions at lower 
frequencies, where high-frequency information is missing. This includes daily analyses con-
sidering trading volume (e.g. Chaboud and LeBaron, 2001, Kim and Sheen, 2006), spillovers 
between exchange rates (Beine, 2004), less liquid exchange rates (Brandner et al., 2006) and 
exchange rate modeling (Reitz and Taylor, 2008). The impact of interventions on volatility by 
a regime switching model is for example based on weekly frequency (Beine et al., 2003, see 
also Brandner et al., 2006). Interventions’ impact on survey based forecast heterogeneity (Be-
ine et al., 2007) and interventions’ impact on real exchange rate behavior (Taylor, 2004) both 
rely on a monthly frequency. However, we neglect these strands of interesting research in 
order to keep focus on intraday analyses. 
Our further procedure will always refer to the structure of ten issues introduced above 
but it follows a different order. As the high-frequency intervention literature is largely driven 
by data availability, we arrange the rest of this survey into three steps that each describe an 
increasing data quality.
4 Section 3 discusses studies which use high-frequency data built on 
quoted prices by dealing banks and news reports about interventions. Section 4 surveys stud-
ies which are able to use precise real transaction data. Finally, Section 5 considers studies 
which analyze order flow data that do not only cover the central bank transactions but also 
further transactions in the market; moreover, the order flow gives information about the 
“sign” of transactions, i.e. whether the initiator intends to buy or to sell. 
 
                                                 
3  There are two specific forms of the signaling channel proposed in the literature, i.e. the noise trader 
channel (Hung, 1997) and the coordination channel (Sarno and Taylor, 2001, Taylor, 2004). However, 
I am not aware of an examination of these channels with intraday data. 
4  Alternative organizations would be possible, of course, but I prefer the data perspective as they de-
fine the bottleneck for applying various approaches.   7
3.  Intervention effects estimated on the basis of quotes and press reports 
This section reports on studies making use of quoted exchange rates and press reports 
about interventions. Three issues have been mainly addressed: first, the identification of inter-
vention impact on exchange rate returns and possibly heterogeneous bank reactions (issue 
no.1), second, the analysis of exchange rate volatility as a consequence of interventions 
(no.5), and, third, the analysis of conditions of successful interventions (no.10). 
 
3.1 Earlier  studies 
Probably the first intervention study using high-frequency data was Goodhart and Hesse 
(1993). They compiled 12 weeks of DEM/USD, JPY/USD and USD/GBP quotes in 1989 (de-
tails in Table 1). The quotes were inserted by participating banks in the Reuters FXFX-page. 
At that time this page was the primary medium for receiving high frequency information in 
foreign exchange to conduct microstructure analyses. Regarding foreign exchange interven-
tions, Goodhart and Hesse (1993) rely on the information in Reuters headline news, i.e. news 
provided in real time to the screens of foreign exchange participants, in particular traders. 
Interestingly, they do not identify a short-term effect of interventions on returns. They do find 
systematic patterns, however, in the conditions affecting the probability of interventions: cen-
tral banks tend to intervene in thin markets, when volatility is high and after prior changes in 
exchange rates. 
Peiers (1997) examines the behavior of single banks around interventions. She finds 
heterogeneity between banks, an information advantage of one bank and increasing (high-
frequency) volatility ahead of reported interventions. A third study in this field is Chang and 
Taylor (1998), who find that volatility is significantly higher in intervention periods and that 
volatility increases at least 30 minutes before the intervention (see Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 
1996, with daily data). Major results hold when Japanese macroeconomic news is considered 
in an ARCH approach as control variable. 
Overall, these early studies indicate that interventions have no clear effect on returns, 
that banks behave in a heterogeneous way and that interventions occur at volatile times. How-
ever, robustness of these results may be questioned because of quite selective time periods, 
markets and participants covered. Moreover, the identification of interventions is imprecise 
and causality between interventions and returns (or volatility) also seems to be debatable. The 
robustness issue is discussed in Section 3.2, whereas the identification and causality concerns 
require different kinds of data and are thus addressed in Section 4. 
   8
3.2 Later  studies 
The limited data coverage of earlier studies presented in Section 3.1 provided the moti-
vation to expand the scope of analysis. A major contribution in this respect is provided by 
Dominguez (2003), who analyzes all interventions of the Federal Reserve in the two most 
important markets, i.e. Deutsche mark/ US dollar and Japanese yen/ US dollar during the pe-
riod 1987 to August 1995 (missing only two more interventions in the following five years). 
Fed interventions occurred on 273 days during this nine year period. In the methodological 
tradition of earlier research, Dominguez (2003) uses an event study approach. She finds ro-
bust evidence that interventions influence returns in the intended direction (see also Fatum 
and Hutchison, 2003, for daily data). The effect of interventions is higher if trading volumes 
are higher, if interventions occur shortly after important macro announcements and if inter-
ventions are coordinated among central banks (see also Humpage, 1999, with daily data). In 
addition, Dominguez (2003) finds that volatility during the event window is higher on inter-
vention days than non-intervention days of the sample. On intervention days, volatility peaks 
around interventions but is at the same level after one hour that it was one hour before the 
intervention. Finally, and in contrast to the finding by Peiers (1997), the increase of volatility 
at interventions times cannot be linked to any of the most active banks in the market. 
In a follow-up paper Dominguez (2006) studies the relation between interventions and 
volatility in a setup considering the intraday pattern of market activity. Nevertheless, qualita-
tive intraday findings are unchanged and she finds “little evidence that interventions system-
atically influence volatility beyond the day of the operations” (p.1068). Cai et al. (2001) are 
the first to use a proxy for order flow, which is highly important in explaining volatility, but it 
does not eliminate a direct effect from interventions. Finally, Chari (2007) examines 125 
banks’ responses to interventions. According to this data, interventions lead to increased vola-
tility and higher spread as found in daily data by Naranjo and Nirmalendran (2000). Focusing 
on the ten largest banks, reaction patterns in bid-ask spreads to interventions differ markedly 
between banks and depend on which central banks intervenes. 
Overall, these later studies establish – still with limited quote data – that interventions 
do indeed have short-term effects on returns and that heterogeneity is important (issue no.1), 
that volatility is higher on intervention days (no.5), that spreads increase after interventions 
(no.6) and that there are conditions which seem to make interventions more powerful (no.10), 
i.e. at volatile times, at high trading volumes and in coordination with other central banks. 
 
   9
4.  Intervention effects estimated on the basis of transaction data 
Despite the progress made by relying on high-frequency exchange rate quotes and news 
reports about interventions, there is no doubt that intervention effects can be much better 
measured by relying on transaction data. This data gives exact prices, intervention volume and 
intervention time, which allows the effect of interventions against competing influences, noise 
or endogeneity of intervention decisions to be more easily identified. 
As this section covers the bulk of the literature, we structure it into six subsections: 4.1 
addresses the studies identifying mistakes in press reports about interventions (issue no.7), 
then there are two sections, 4.2 and 4.3, which focus on two different intervention regimes 
with respective intervention objectives (no.4), i.e. the Swiss case with occasional interven-
tions in floating exchange rates and the Canadian case with more ambitious stabilization ob-
jectives – these cases also address volatility (no.5) and spread (no.6). Recent evidence from 
other currencies on intervention effects is provided in subsection 4.4. Subsection 4.5 reviews 
studies providing counterfactual evidence to support the effect of interventions (no.8) and 
subsection 4.6 gives a short interim summary. 
 
4.1  Mistakes in intervention press reports 
A first obvious analysis which can be conducted due to the revelation of intervention 
transactions is a comparison of actual transactions with press reports about interventions. 
These comparisons consistently find remarkable differences which explain to some extent the 
often weak intervention effects of earlier studies (see Section 3). 
The pioneering study in this line of research is Klein (1993). He analyses US interven-
tions during the years 1985-89 after their precise occurrence had been made public by the 
Federal Reserve in summer 1991. This period covers 1294 trading days and 232 intervention 
days, with aggregate values of either dollar purchase or sales of the Federal Reserve for each 
day. Klein’s main finding is that by far most interventions are reported correctly by the New 
York Times or the Wall Street Journal (larger interventions are reported better) but that there 
are serious mistakes in press reports in two directions: only 72% of actual interventions are 
reported, i.e. 28% stay unreported, and only 88% of reported interventions happen at all. Ob-
viously, press reports are a noisy source of actual interventions and accordingly cause limited 
precision of analyses that have to build on them (as reviewed in Section 3) – this provides an 
unambiguous and important finding on issue no.7. 
This result for the US has later been qualitatively confirmed for Japanese interventions 
(Frenkel et al., 2004) as well as for Swiss interventions (Fischer, 2006); some details are   10
given in Table 2. Although the Swiss experience does not find reported interventions that did 
not occur, this case study allows the analysis – due to the high-frequency data – of mistakes in 
reporting precision. Indeed, the quality of Reuters headline news is questionable for the Swiss 
case as Reuters announcements can be late by hours and not by minutes as typically assumed. 
In several cases, however, announcements occur slightly before interventions – due to the 
disclosure practice of the Swiss National Bank. Interestingly, the Japanese case shows that 
newspaper reports may even miss most actual interventions (in the sample covered by Frenkel 
et al., 2004), whereas Reuters news seems to be more precise in a longer sample covered by 
Galati et al. (2005). 
 
4.2  Intervention in a floating exchange rate: the Swiss case 
The first study analyzing interventions with transaction data is Fischer and Zurlinden 
(1999, p.663) using a data set that “includes all transactions the SNB [Swiss National Bank] 
carried out on the Swiss franc/ U.S. dollar market between 1986 and 1994”. The data include 
362 interventions on 87 days and 367 further central bank transactions which are not interven-
tions, called customer transactions, on 226 days. All of these interventions are sterilized and 
coordinated with respective interventions of the Federal Reserve or the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(3 days with non-sterilized and non-coordinated interventions were excluded from the data 
set). An interesting aspect of these transactions is the distinction due to the purpose of transac-
tion. As Fischer and Zurlinden (1999, p.665) write: “The SNB informs her counterparties that 
the transaction is an intervention straight after the deal is concluded”. Thus, the intervention 
price itself is a regular market price, the same as it is in the case of a customer transaction 
(which means that the central bank intermediates the order of its customer, the federal gov-
ernment). If interventions have any impact on the market, this has to materialize after the ac-
tual transaction. 
As Fischer and Zurlinden do not have a time series of either market prices or quotes 
available, they construct a series by relying on their transaction prices. This implies that the 
last transaction on each day has to be neglected in the analysis and that intervals are irregu-
larly spaced. In order to account for the last argument, they correct the price changes for the 
well-known non-linear pattern during the day. Based on this data, they find that interventions 
have the expected impact on the exchange rate, i.e. buying a currency stabilizes its value, 
whereas customer transactions do not. This indicates that interventions are not just successful 
by causing a liquidity effect but that interventions give a signal to the market. This finding is 
strengthened by the fact that the first intervention of a series has impact, but not so the follow-  11
ing ones (and neither have the number of other central banks or the amount of intervention) – 
it seems that market participants correctly anticipate that a first intervention may be followed 
by more. 
The effect of interventions on returns has been further investigated by Payne and Vitale 
(2003), who add another year to the data (see Table 3 for an overview of intervention studies 
based on transaction data). Moreover, they use exchange rate quotes (unfortunately no trans-
action prices) with a 15 minutes frequency to analyze the market. This gives a more detailed 
picture than the large intraday intervals in the Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) study and yields 
three insights: interventions have a stronger impact if they are concerted and if they go with 
the market. Third, returns seem to move in the 15 minutes’ interval before the intervention 
takes place, indicating that there is some anticipation of the later action. In addition, Payne 
and Vitale (2003) apply the standard SVAR-approach of Habrouck (1991) to separate price 
impacts of transactions into transitory liquidity effects and longer-lasting information effects. 
This is an important methodological innovation to the intervention literature as interventions 
will almost necessarily have an impact due to the taking of liquidity out of the market but this 
liquidity effect will dry out after a short while, raising the question whether there remains a 
“permanent” impact. Interestingly, interventions have a significant permanent effect in the 
interbank market, indicating that interventions are interpreted as informed trades. 
Whereas these studies address the impact issue (no.1) with different methods and thus 
confirm the earlier result of a clear short-term price impact of interventions, the Swiss data 
have also been used to address a possible impact of interventions on volatility and spread (is-
sues no.5 and 6). The major study in this respect is Pasquariello (2007) who further expands 
the Swiss data until 1998. He also uses quotes, although at 5 minute intervals. His focus is on 
exchange rate volatility and liquidity (whereas earlier findings on returns are confirmed). 
Findings indicate – on a daily aggregate level – that interventions are related with increased 
and persistent higher volatility and increased spreads, the latter being interpreted as reduced 
liquidity (picking up the daily analysis of Bossaerts and Hillion, 1991). This is consistent with 
two interpretations: first, interventions provide new information to the market, which needs to 
be compounded in prices over time and second, interventions may come at a price to be paid 
by the private actors, i.e. higher spreads (or reduced liquidity). 
Of course, it seems obvious that more evidence beyond the Swiss case is warranted, so 
we also report findings based on different data sets. 
   12
4.3  Interventions with ambitious objectives: the Canadian case 
The Bank of Canada was the only other central bank – apart from the Swiss National 
Bank – to provide exact intervention data, although only to researchers being affiliated to the 
central bank itself. We give a short review of three studies. 
Beattie and Fillion (1999) are the first to analyze the Canadian dollar/ US dollar inter-
vention history between April 1995 and September 1997. This period covers 56 intervention 
days during which interventions occur at 168 intervals of 10 minute length. Thus, the fre-
quency of interventions is roughly comparable to the Swiss case, whereas the period covered 
is shorter. There is an interesting feature of the Canadian experience in that the Canadian cen-
tral bank intended to keep its currency inside a pre-defined band, although without explicitly 
stating a fixed target zone (see Beattie and Fillion, 1999, for a detailed description). Neverthe-
less, market participants – according to the account of Beattie and Fillion – correctly antici-
pated the band. Due to this anticipation interventions can be differentiated into expected, 
“mechanical” interventions in order to “slow rapid movements of the dollar”, thereby reduc-
ing volatility (Beattie and Fillion, 1999, p.4), and into unexpected, “discretionary” interven-
tions. 
The method applied in this paper differs in two respects from the analysis of the Swiss 
data: first, Beattie and Fillion (1999) use a time series approach (instead of the event study 
discussed in Section 4.1), and second, due to the many data that make up the full time series, 
they are able to control for other determinants that might influence this time series beyond 
interventions. In particular, this is the first intervention study to control for an intraday sea-
sonal pattern, for daily volatility persistence by way of a GARCH (1,1) model and for several 
macroeconomic news announcements from Canada and the US. 
It follows from the intervention purpose of the Bank of Canada that the study focuses on 
volatility only, i.e. issue no.5. The effect of intervention on volatility is threefold: first, ex-
pected interventions do not matter, unexpected interventions do reduce volatility (although 
not during a sample extension until January 1998) and the non-intervention band tends to sta-
bilize exchange rate changes (although to an economically small degree only). 
The study of D’Souza (2002) takes a somewhat different time period than Beattie and 
Fillion (1999) in order to cover another regime: the period 1.1996 to 9.1998 matches the 
above described regime, whereas the central bank did only replenish reserves between 
10.1998 and 9.1999. Reserve replenishment serves as a counterfactual to interventions in the 
spirit of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999). Unfortunately, D’Souza analyzes daily data but has the 
advantage of breaking down transactions to various participants. His price impact analyses   13
show that not all participants have the same impact and that the central bank belongs to the 
more important ones. However, due to its “leaning against the wind”-policy, it seems prob-
lematic to evaluate Bank of Canada interventions by the price impact criterion with daily data. 
Taking the impact on volatility, D’Souza (2002, p.22) reinforces Beattie and Fillion (1999) in 
the view that interventions immediately decrease volatility whereas replenishment operations 
do not, indicating that the non-intervention band has some effect. 
More recently, Fatum and King (2005) provide another extension of data and scope. 
Their period of investigation ends in September 1998; however, it already starts in January 
1995 in order to also cover an earlier regime of interventions which was characterized by fre-
quent and purely mechanistic interventions. This regime was superseded by the one described 
above with less frequent and less mechanistic interventions. Moreover, Fatum and King 
(2005) take account of so-called “currency co-movement”, i.e.  controlling possible interven-
tion effects in the minor Canadian dollar market by considering the overall trend of the US 
dollar.
5 The method applied in this study is similar to the event studies of Chang and Taylor 
(1998) or Payne and Vitale (2003). 
Fatum and King (2005) find that intervention changes returns in the intended direction 
but that the intended effect on exchange rate smoothing and volatility exists only for raw data 
but not when considering currency co-movement. Moreover, they state that the impact of 
mechanistic versus discretionary interventions is the same; they interpret this as evidence 
against the signaling channel and in favor of the portfolio balance channel. It seems interest-
ing to note, however, that the latter may be a bit far reaching, as Beattie and Fillion (1999) 
provide a different interpretation: they do not find the intended effect of interventions on vola-
tility during the end of their period either and explain this by the inconsistent signals of the 
central bank as intervention policy and interest rate policy do not fit together. 
This (implicit) debate refers again to the more deeply rooted problem; how do we use-
fully measure the success of central bank interventions, in particular, what is the marginal 
contribution of interventions? The Canadian experience suggests that the goal of reducing 
volatility by respective interventions can be met to some extent, but crucially depends on an 
overall credible policy (no.4). Moreover, it seems difficult for a small country to move the 
exchange rate against world-wide trends (condition of intervention, issue no.10). 
 
                                                 
5  Fatum (2008) analyzes the importance of currency co-movement on the same data, but on a daily 
basis, and finds that this effect weakens the measured impact of intervention.   14
4.4  Complementary recent evidence 
The Swiss and Canadian data sets have become outdated to some extent as interventions 
of these central banks did not occur after 1998. Moreover, we observe major changes in for-
eign exchange market microstructure (Rime, 2003) which might have an impact on market 
behavior. Thus there is need of additional and more recent data. 
A study covering interventions of the Bank of Japan for the long period from May 1991 
to March 2004 is Kim (2007). He addresses the identification problem by breaking down the 
24-hour trading day into three time zones, marked by the market opening in Japan, then the 
Japanese closing (which is slightly ahead of the European opening) and finally the London 
closing (which occurs during New York afternoon trading and which is hours ahead of the 
next day’s Japanese opening). As Japanese interventions occur mostly around Tokyo lunch-
time, this structuring allows one to distinguish immediate effects of intervention on returns 
and volatility, i.e. during the Japanese market, a first overnight analysis covering the time 
until London closing and a second overnight time covering the New York afternoon hours. 
In accordance with Ito and Yabu (2007), Kim (2007) distinguishes two intervention re-
gimes of the Bank of Japan: until 1995 interventions occurred more frequently but with lesser 
amounts, i.e. 50 billion yen per day compared to 328 billion yen in the second period. During 
the first regime, interventions have unwanted short-term effects (during Japanese trading) in 
that they impact returns in the “wrong” direction and increase volatility. These effects reverse 
overnight. During the second regime, interventions impact returns immediately and reduce 
volatility overnight. 
The Danish central bank has also recently provided intervention information. Fatum and 
Pedersen (2007) analyze Danish interventions in the Danish krone/ euro exchange rate for the 
three-year period January 2002 to December 2004. Market rates are end of 5-minute interval 
exchange rates, purchased from Olson and Associates. The method is similar to Beattie and 
Fillion (1999) in that this study applies a time series analysis controlling for intraday pattern, 
volatility levels and macroeconomic news announcements. 
This research provides new insights in three respects: first, it confirms for a recent pe-
riod that interventions move exchange rates in the intended direction. Second, it applies an 
endogenous structural break test and shows that the two sub-periods are different. The later, 
longer sub-period provides more favorable results for intervention policy which is explained 
by Fatum and Pedersen (2007) by consistency with interest rate policy. Third, as interventions 
occur bilaterally with single banks and are unannounced, they may need up to 30 minutes to 
fully impact the market. However, the Danish case cannot easily be transferred to other coun-  15
tries, as the Danish krone is part of the European Monetary System encompassing EU mem-
bers which have not joined the monetary union (yet). 
Due to the coverage of currencies and circumstances being still rather limited, it also 
seems useful to mention studies which address experience from emerging markets, even 
though the data frequency is not intraday.
6 Disyatat and Galati (2007) conclude that this litera-
ture shows a very high degree of sample dependency, where an intervention effect on the ex-
change rate level is less clear than the tendency that interventions reduce volatility. 
 
4.5  Counterfactual evidence to intervention effects on returns 
From a methodological point of view, there may always remain some skepticism about 
the identification of intervention effects because of two competing influences. First, it seems 
difficult to fully control for other price relevant determinants and second, intervention times 
seem to be particular times, thus creating the problem of endogeneity. Therefore it is very 
useful to review counterfactual evidence (issue no.8), i.e. transactions that are as similar as 
possible to true interventions but which in effect are not. Three approaches have been devel-
oped in the recent literature. 
First, there is evidence from the Swiss National Bank as this central bank does not only 
proceed interventions but also acts as agent for customer transactions of the government and 
both kinds of transaction data are available in comparable form. As reported in subsection 4.2, 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) show that only interventions impact the subsequent exchange 
rate whereas customer transactions do not. In a similar vein, D’Souza (2002) shows for Can-
ada that more technical replenishment of reserves has – unlike interventions – no effect on 
volatility. Obviously, interventions are regarded as informative about future prices, consistent 
with the signaling channel. 
Another approach is chosen by Payne and Vitale (2003), again with the Swiss data. 
They work with higher frequency data than Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and have informa-
tion about order flow in the whole market, which enables them to calculate price impacts. 
They apply the Hasbrouck (1991) SVAR approach and do not only show that interventions 
have price impact (see above) but also show that the price impact of interventions is several 
times larger than the average price impact in the interbank market under review. Thus, central 
                                                 
6  Emerging countries are of interest as interventions occur there more commonly nowadays than in 
industrialized countries. Moreover, one may expect that interventions are more powerful due to market 
conditions (see Disyatat and Galati, 2007). In particular, limited market volumes support the relevance 
of a portfolio balance channel, less credibility (e.g. due to shorter history) of authorities may weaken 
the signaling channel, whereas the typically greater state influence in financial markets will strengthen 
the position of an intervening central bank.   16
banks are obviously regarded as very well informed market participants (see also D’Souza, 
2002). 
In a third approach, Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) analyze the effect of so-called un-
requited interventions, i.e. reported interventions which did not occur in reality. If market par-
ticipants assume informed trading by central banks, one would expect that even such requited 
interventions move the market to some degree (as oral interventions do, see Fratzscher, 2006). 
This would also support the signaling channel but discourage the portfolio balance channel 
because a portfolio shift does not occur. In fact, this study finds that requited interventions 
have similar impact as real interventions; again, this supports the notion that central bank in-
terventions are important. 
Overall, these different ways of revealing the effect of interventions by counterfactual 
evidence (issue no.8) contribute to strengthening the view that foreign exchange interventions 
can be a useful policy tool. At the same time, these findings heighten the stakes against the 
conduct of secret interventions. 
 
4.6 Interim  summary 
The use of transaction data has in several ways improved our understanding about the 
working of interventions. The unambiguous result that interventions do indeed impact ex-
change rate return during the intraday horizon is the most important. The following ingredi-
ents have been helpful in confirming this result: first, the use of transaction data has improved 
precision about the fact and timing of interventions (issue no.7). Second, evidence beyond the 
G3 countries and the use of various methods have increased confidence in the generality of 
impact findings (no.1).
7 A major step in this respect has been – third – the evidence from 
counterfactuals (no.8). 
Then, coverage has been increased by including impact assessment of interventions on 
(high-frequency) volatility and spreads (no.5, 6). Whereas the majority of findings indicate 
that interventions go hand in hand with – and possibly lead to – higher volatility and spread, 
the Canadian experience (and also related evidence from emerging markets) suggests that 
intervention may also be able to reduce volatility, if this is a policy objective (no.4). Finally 
and similar to findings in Section 3, the impact of interventions is higher if interventions are 
concerted among central banks (no.10). Moreover, impact is higher if intervention goes with 
                                                 
7  The additional country evidence – beyond the United States, Japan and Germany – includes Switzer-
land, Canada and Denmark, the methods include event studies and time-series approaches and inter-
ventions’ impact is measured by direct price changes as well as by permanent price changes (in the 
sense of Hasbrouck, 1991).   17
the market and if it goes with fundamentals, whereas market impact is reduced if world-wide 
market trends are taken into account.  
 
5.  Intervention effects estimated on the basis of order flow data 
All the studies considered so far analyze the isolated impact of interventions on prices, 
here exchange rates. If one interprets interventions as an order flow of the central bank, the 
question arises, in which way this order flow may be different from other flows occurring 
during the same period and whether it may impact these other flows. Unfortunately, there is 
hardly any data available in this field.
8 
The conceptual idea motivating the analysis of order flow data is that it may represent 
information. Lyons (2001) argues that in markets with potentially heterogeneous and spread 
information, such as foreign exchange, the trading process is a means to incorporate informa-
tion into prices. The information is approximated by the sign (and potentially the size) of 
transactions, i.e. order flow. However, there are also liquidity and hedging motivations for 
transactions, which raises the question whether an observed order flow does indeed represent 
information. It is thus a consequential procedure to analyze the impact of order flow generated 
by the central bank, i.e. interventions. 
The first work bringing order flow analysis and interventions together is Evans and Ly-
ons (2005). Their aim is to assess the potential of secret intervention by carefully analyzing 
the price impact of ordinary order flow. Based on hourly data of Deutsche mark/ US dollar 
rates over four months in 1996 – the same data base as in their seminal paper (Evans and Ly-
ons, 2002) – they estimate the immediate price impact of a 1 billion USD order flow to be 
0.44 percent, of which 83 percent persists permanently. This suggests that interventions of 
respective size would be able to change market equilibrium by way of a portfolio balance ef-
fect if secret interventions had the same market impact as interbank order flow, which is as-
sumed in the empirical estimation here. Unfortunately, this study does not directly observe 
interventions so that conclusions are indicative only. 
A step forward is thus the analysis of Scalia (2008), who can include information about 
interventions in the market for Czech koruna versus euro (CZK/EUR). The market data come 
from the Reuters 3000 electronic trading system and cover an estimated 35% share of all or-
der flow in this exchange rate. Even though Scalia (2008) does not have precise intervention 
data available, he develops reasonable arguments about the existence of interventions on a 
                                                 
8  Vitale (2006, p.21) reports that the Federal Reserve during its last large intervention in 2000 split 
orders between the electronic brokerage system EBS and direct trading with several banks.   18
daily basis and their distribution during the day, which can be linked to hourly order flow 
data. Moreover, he can observe three intervention regimes which are distinguished by the de-
gree to which the market knows about interventions. Better knowledge increases the impact of 
order flow, indicating that interventions provide information and support the signaling chan-
nel. The estimated price impact per 10 million USD order flow starts with 6.6 basis points for 
totally secret interventions increases to 9.3 basis points for partially expected interventions 
and almost doubles to 12.2 basis points for expected interventions. 
Girardin and Lyons (2007) cover daily Japanese yen/ US dollar rates, interventions and 
customer order flow of Citibank, representing about 10 percent of the worldwide market. I 
give a short report of findings because of the pioneering character of this study (despite its 
daily frequency). It is reassuring that interventions significantly impact exchange rate returns 
even when controlled for other order flow; there is no robust impact on volatility. A real inspi-
ration for our survey, however, is the question whether interventions impact the order flow of 
other participants. 
The damping channel (issue no.9) hypothesizes that credible interventions dominate the 
information environment in the market and thus reduce or even eliminate the price impact of 
private order flow. The coordination channel states that interventions initiate a change in pri-
vate order flow into the direction set by the central bank. Neither effect, damping or coordina-
tion of private order flow, is significantly revealed in the Girardin and Lyons (2007) analysis, 
but they are conceptually introduced and seem possible in principle. One possible reason why 
they are not revealed is the daily frequency. 
There is so far one study covering total order flow in an interbank market, including that 
of the central bank (Melvin et al., 2008). The Russian market MICEX had at the time of study 
– in 2002 – newly introduced a technology similar to the Reuters electronic trading. Even 
though the country wide “unified trading session” (UTS) is not the single trading platform, as 
there coexist several regional bourses as well as some direct bilateral trade between banks, the 
important country-wide exchange rate fixing takes place there. The fixing is relevant for for-
eign exchange operations of many commercial customers. Moreover, the central bank inter-
venes in this market to ensure an exchange rate, Russian rouble versus US dollar, which is 
accepted by authorities. Reuters headline news as well as the order book data indicate that the 
central bank does not intervene every day, although often. The data period in this study from 
March 2002 covers 5 days with interventions and 9 days without interventions. This allows 
the comparison of intervention and non-intervention periods.   19
Interventions are conducted by putting two very large limit orders into the market: a 
cheaper bid and a more expensive ask offer of the dollar create an exchange rate band which, 
indeed, limits movements of the exchange rate during the sample. Due to voluminous foreign 
exchange reserves of the Russian central bank allowing for huge intervention orders in rela-
tion to normal transactions and due to the overall high importance of the state in the Russian 
economy, the band seems to be credible. 
Based on a relatively short but deep data base, there are the following results: first, ex-
change rate returns are affected by interventions in the sense that the band set by the central 
bank holds. Second, the relation between interventions and volatility is complex: seen from 
the intraday perspective, volatility is higher directly after interventions, indicating that infor-
mation is flowing into the market. Seen from the daily perspective, volatility is lower during 
intervention days, indicating that the band seems to dampen volatility, possibly similar to the 
Canadian experience. 
Third, another unique feature of this study of the Russian market is the analysis of in-
formed and uninformed participants in the market who react differently to interventions: the 
uninformed “accept” the band set by the central bank, whereas the “informed” tend to trade 
against the band. The latter do not seem to be irrational, as Reuters headline news indicate 
that fundamentals justify the informed behavior, i.e. expecting a depreciation of the rouble at 
that time. 
There are two more interesting effects of interventions: they increase trading volume 
and reduce the spread, indicating that liquidity is abundant. This smaller spread in combina-
tion with more liquidity brings benefits to the less informed participants in the market. 
In summary, it seems that the Russian central bank realizes the gains of a kind of target 
zone by stabilizing exchange rate volatility and also by reducing trading costs. It thus repeats 
the success found for the Canadian central bank and avoids the increased costs documented 
for the Swiss case (Pasquariello, 2007). Of course the informed market participants may real-
ize intermediate profits from the central bank’s “leaning against the wind” strategy. 
 
6.  Implications for intervention policy 
Exchange rate interventions are not only a textbook tool of policy-making in open 
economies but they also seem to work to some extent, as demonstrated in this survey. In con-
trast to this prominence there is the fact that major central banks have stopped intervening 
during the last decade.   20
An obvious explanation for this contrast is the rapid growth in transaction volume on 
foreign exchange markets, roughly by a factor of four over the last 15 years. Regular surveys 
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (2007) show that daily transaction vol-
umes in the six main exchange rates are above 100 billion US dollar per day. The relative 
shift in weight towards “other financial institutions”, i.e. fund managers of various kinds, in-
cluding large currency hedge funds or currency overlay operations is possibly even more rele-
vant than the volume growth and its sheer size (Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2005). Fund managers 
are – unlike typical bank trading – willing to keep high open positions and thus to potentially 
speculate against a central bank. Thus the “market power” of major central bank interventions 
– reflecting mainly a potential portfolio balance channel – has been dramatically weakened. 
This argument does not apply to the same extent to the situation of smaller markets and in 
particular to many emerging economies. Their currencies are characterized by smaller trans-
action volume and at the same time central banks tend to command large currency reserves. 
Finally, emerging markets can often be steered via capital controls. 
This discussion provides some explanation as to why major central banks in particular 
stopped interventions. In addition, high-frequency research has contributed to the improve-
ment of our understanding of possible success conditions for interventions. The finding that 
interventions cannot succeed if they do not fit into overall economic policy, in particular 
monetary policy is intuitely plausible. Moreover, exchange rates move more when interven-
tions go with the market – which is, however, not the normal intervention situation. Finally, 
the impact of interventions increases if they are coordinated among various central banks, a 
condition that cannot be taken as fulfilled in a world with diverging national interests. 
In summary, neither market developments nor findings of recent research provide the 
stimulus to make more use of interventions in the main foreign exchange markets – or to ex-
press it more positively: interventions can impact the market but only under certain condi-
tions. These conditions are more easily met in minor or emerging markets. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Recent empirical high-frequency research on central bank interventions in foreign ex-
change permits answers to longstanding open questions. This may influence the decisions of 
policy makers as to whether and how to conduct interventions. 
Possibly the most controversial question was whether interventions would really affect 
exchange rate returns or whether the relatively small intervention amounts might get lost in 
the overwhelming flood of trading volumes. The use of high-frequency data (and transaction   21
data) has made it clear that interventions do indeed affect returns in the short-run. Admittedly, 
a very short-term impact can be due to liquidity effects only. From this perspective, it seems 
particularly important that counterfactuals have been investigated, such as the finding that 
interventions move returns but other central bank transactions do not (Fischer and Zurlinden, 
1999). 
Regarding an intervention impact on volatility, a first important insight is to realize the 
high degree of endogeneity. Interventions occur at volatile times so it is not enough to com-
pare volatility at intervention with non-intervention days but to observe the change in volatil-
ity after interventions. In this respect studies for the major markets find that interventions in-
crease volatility in the short-term, but not beyond the day. Obviously, the fact of interventions 
is seen as information (thus the first intervention in a sequence sometimes matters most). Un-
related to this finding, credible non-intervention bands (see Canada) or a kind of short-term 
exchange rate target zones (see Russia) may be able to reduce volatility. 
Recent high-frequency research has also shed new light on the importance of transmis-
sion channels. Whereas the signaling channel seemed to be the only plausible one considering 
the relative size of interventions to total trading volume, the focus on order flow may change 
perception. Accordingly, it is not volume that matters but direction, so that decisive interven-
tions – which go into one direction – may even force markets by “brute force”. Moreover, 
there is some first evidence that interventions may reduce the price impact from private trades 
via the so-called damping channel. Finally, research has sharpened the understanding of suc-
cess conditions for interventions (see Section 6). 
In summary, knowledge about interventions has much improved. Even if central banks 
may not feel like operating in a laboratory, they are well informed about important effects of 
their decisions and also about the necessary requirements to be successful. Nevertheless, sev-
eral issues require further investigation, among them a better coverage of intervention effects 
on spreads (in order to learn more about possible intervention costs), a more systematic un-
derstanding of intervention effects in emerging markets (where interventions are presently 
mainly exercised) and a deeper look into the functioning of intervention channels by the ap-
plication of order flow data (which allow for the most precise measurement). 
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•  volatility higher at intervention days 
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Table 2.  Studies on the accuracy of intervention press reports 
 

























•  72% of actual interventions are 
reported (daily data) 
•  88% of reported interventions do 
occur 














•  about 90% of actual interventions 
(per day) are reported 
•  100% of reported interventions do 
occur 
•  the reported timing of interventions is 
often imprecise by hours 










JPY/USD Bank  of 
Japan 
•  45% of actual interventions are re-
ported (daily data) 
•  60% of repeated interventions do 
occur 
•  larger interventions are not better 
reported, but coordinated interven-
tions are 
Galati et al. 
(2001)  
Sep. 93 – 
Apr. 00; 
Reuters 
JPY/USD Bank  of 
Japan 
•  77% of actual interventions are re-
ported (daily data)  
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Jan. 86 – Dec. 









•  interventions have price impact, but 
other central bank transactions have 
not 





Jan. 86 – Dec. 





•  apply Hasbrouck (1991) price 
impact SVAR approach 
•  impact is higher, if interventions 
go with the market and if they are 
concerted 





Jan. 86 – Dec. 
98;                  




•  interventions are related to 





Apr. 95 – Sep. 
97;                
10 min. 
CAD/USD Bank  of 
Canada 
•  time series approach, control for 
intraday seasonal pattern, for daily 
volatility persistence and macro 
news 
•  unexpected interventions reduce 
volatility 
•  the non-intervention band tends 




Jan. 95 – Sep. 
98;                  
5 min.  
CAD/USD Bank  of 
Canada 
•  event study approach 
•  price impact on returns 
•  interventions reduce volatility, 
but effect disappears when consid-
ering currency co-movement 
•  the same impact of discretionary 




May 91 – Mar. 
04;                  
3 intervals 
JPY/USD Bank  of 
Japan 
•  regime-dependent impact on 
returns 
•  interventions reduce volatility 






Jan. 02 – Dec. 
04;                  




•  interventions have price impact  
•  effect is higher if consistent with 
fundamentals and if volatility is 
high 
•  adjustment to intervention news 
may need about 30 min. 
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• analyze the regular price impact: 
0.44 basis points per 10 mill USD 










•  regular price impact: 6.6 basis 
points 
•  secret interventions but still high 
likelihood: 9.3 basis points 
•  interventions with high likelihood 





July 95 – 
March 04;    
daily 




•  intervention impacts return (even 
controlled for other order flow) 
•  no robust impact on volatility 
•  no clear evidence on a damping 




22), all orders, 
30 seconds 
RUR/USD Bank  of 
Russia 
•  intervention increases volatility 
and spread for minutes  
•  intervention days have lower vola-
tility and spread than non-
intervention days 
•  informed banks take positions 
against the intervention band 
•  interventions increase trading 
volume and decrease spread 
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